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How to harden a Pulsar container (and is apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2 safe for untrusted workloads?)

A message broker sits between every producer and consumer in your system, which is exactly why its container should be one of the tightest. A stock docker run apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2 is closer than most, it already runs as a non-root user, but graded on IronClaw's seven-dimension containment scale it still scores only 63 of 100, grade C (partial). Higher is safer. A couple of runtime flags take the same image to 89 of 100, grade B, one point off an A, and the one dimension it cannot reach is the one a broker needs by definition (producers and consumers must connect to it). Here are the exact gaps and fixes from the scan data.

Graded from a read-only inspect of a running container started from apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2 with plain docker run defaults, its entrypoint overridden with sleep purely to keep it alive. The scan itself executes nothing inside the container. It is the same data behind its isolation scorecard. How scoring works →

Where the default configuration leaks

ironctl scan grades seven independent containment boundaries. On a default docker run apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2, three fail or warn (and, notably, non-root already passes):

Dimension Verdict Score What the scan found
Non-root user (uid != 0) ✅ PASS 15/15 runs as 10000 (uid != 0)
Dropped capabilities ❌ FAIL 4/20 default capability set retained (CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_MKNOD, and more)
Seccomp profile ✅ PASS 15/15 seccomp profile active
Network isolation / egress ⚠️ WARN 4/15 network=bridge: outbound egress is possible
Read-only root filesystem ❌ FAIL 0/10 root filesystem is writable
No docker.sock exposure ✅ PASS 15/15 no control socket mounted
No shared host namespaces ✅ PASS 10/10 no host PID/IPC/network sharing

Pulsar's image already did the hardest part, it drops root. The sharpest edges that remain are the retained capabilities and the writable rootfs: a broker or function-runtime CVE that lands code execution lands it with CAP_NET_RAW and friends, on the process every message in your stack passes through, and with a filesystem it can rewrite to persist.

Harden it: the exact --fix remediation

ironctl scan my-pulsar --fix prints one remediation per failed dimension, then one hardened run. For apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2:

  • --cap-drop=ALL (Dropped capabilities, +16): drop every Linux capability; add back only what the workload provably needs. Pulsar needs none of the defaults for a standard listen on its broker port.
  • --read-only --tmpfs /tmp (Read-only rootfs, +10): make the root filesystem read-only and mount Pulsar's data and ledger paths (/pulsar/data) as explicit writable volumes. Removes the persistence surface.
  • Scoped network (Network isolation): --network=none scores the full 15 but is wrong for a broker, producers and consumers must reach it. Any named or bridge network scores 4 of 15 (a WARN, not a fail): a connection path exists. This is the one dimension a broker cannot max out. Contain it anyway: attach a user-defined network scoped to just its clients, with no default route out, so a compromised broker cannot call arbitrary internet addresses.

No --user flag is needed: the image already runs as uid 10000.

Before and after

# Before: 63/100, grade C
docker run -d --name pulsar apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2

# After: 89/100, grade B (scoped private network for producers and consumers)
docker run -d --name pulsar-hardened \
  --cap-drop=ALL \
  --security-opt=no-new-privileges \
  --read-only --tmpfs /tmp \
  -v pulsar-data:/pulsar/data \
  --network=pulsar-internal \
  apachepulsar/pulsar:3.3.2

Rescan: ironctl scan pulsar-hardened reports 89/100 grade B. A 26-point swing with no custom image build, just the right flags. The only dimension still short of full marks is the network (4 of 15), because a broker exists to be connected through; network=none would score the last points but leave nothing able to publish or subscribe. That is the honest ceiling for a broker, and it is a clear step up from the default C.

Verify it on your own broker

# install (Homebrew)
brew install ironsecco/ironclaw/ironclaw

# grade your running container, then print the fixes
ironctl scan my-pulsar
ironctl scan my-pulsar --fix

ironctl scan also reads a docker-compose.yml service or a Kubernetes manifest, so you can grade the Pulsar in your stack, not just a bare docker run.

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