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How to harden a Dgraph container (and is dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5 safe for untrusted workloads?)

A graph database holds the relationships at the center of your data, so its container should be one of the tightest things you run. A stock docker run dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5 is not: graded on IronClaw's seven-dimension containment scale it scores 48 of 100, grade D (porous). Higher is safer. A short list of runtime flags takes the same image to 100 of 100, grade A, because a graph database that only its co-located services query can drop its network entirely. Here are the exact gaps and fixes from the scan data.

Every number here comes from a read-only docker inspect of dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5, the same data behind its isolation scorecard. No workload is executed. How scoring works →

Where the default configuration leaks

ironctl scan grades seven independent containment boundaries. On a default docker run dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5, four fail or warn:

Dimension Verdict Score What the scan found
Non-root user (uid != 0) ❌ FAIL 0/15 runs as root (uid 0); a container escape starts with host-uid 0
Dropped capabilities ❌ FAIL 4/20 default capability set retained (CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_MKNOD, and more)
Seccomp profile ✅ PASS 15/15 seccomp profile active
Network isolation / egress ⚠️ WARN 4/15 network=bridge: outbound egress is possible
Read-only root filesystem ❌ FAIL 0/10 root filesystem is writable
No docker.sock exposure ✅ PASS 15/15 no control socket mounted
No shared host namespaces ✅ PASS 10/10 no host PID/IPC/network sharing

The sharpest edges are root, the retained capabilities, and the writable rootfs: a query-parser or plugin CVE that lands code execution lands it as uid 0, with CAP_NET_RAW and friends, on a filesystem it can rewrite to persist.

Harden it: the exact --fix remediation

ironctl scan my-dgraph --fix prints one remediation per failed dimension, then one hardened run. For dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5:

  • --user 1000:1000 (Non-root, +15): run the process as an unprivileged uid. Point the data directory at a volume that uid owns.
  • --cap-drop=ALL (Dropped capabilities, +16): drop every Linux capability; add back only what the workload provably needs. Dgraph needs none of the defaults.
  • --read-only --tmpfs /tmp (Read-only rootfs, +10): make the root filesystem read-only and mount the data path as an explicit writable volume. Removes the persistence surface.
  • --network=none (Network isolation, +11): a single-node graph database that only its co-located app queries needs no external network at all. Attach it to app services over a private compose network and cut the default route out. This is the dimension that takes it to a full A.

Before and after

# Before: 48/100, grade D
docker run -d --name dgraph dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5

# After: 100/100, grade A
docker run -d --name dgraph-hardened \
  --user 1000:1000 \
  --cap-drop=ALL \
  --security-opt=no-new-privileges \
  --read-only --tmpfs /tmp \
  -v dgraph-data:/dgraph \
  --network=none \
  dgraph/dgraph:v24.0.5

Rescan: ironctl scan dgraph-hardened reports 100/100 grade A. A 52-point swing with no custom image build, just the right flags.

Running a cluster? A multi-node Dgraph (alpha and zero nodes, or remote clients) needs the nodes to reach each other, so --network=none is wrong there. Keep the other four fixes and attach a scoped private network; the honest ceiling is then 89/100, grade B, with the network dimension held at a WARN. Single-node with a co-located app reaches the full A.

Verify it on your own database

# install (Homebrew)
brew install ironsecco/ironclaw/ironclaw

# grade your running container, then print the fixes
ironctl scan my-dgraph
ironctl scan my-dgraph --fix

ironctl scan also reads a docker-compose.yml service or a Kubernetes manifest, so you can grade the Dgraph in your stack, not just a bare docker run.

Keep going